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THE CARMACK AMENDMENT DOES NOT REGULATE THE LIABILITY OF AN NVOCC. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the 
Carmack Amendment does not regulate the liability of an NVOCC. Furthermore, 
an ocean carrier and trucking company cannot be bound by a forum selection 
clause provided by a through bill of lading, although they are subject to COGSA's 
$500 per package limitation. 
Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance PLC v. Ocean World Lines, Inc. 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
572 F.Supp.2d 379 
(Decided August 1 9, 2008) 
Ocean World Lines ("OWL"), a non-vessel operating common carrier (''NVOCC"), issued a 
through bill of lading to White Horse Machinery, an exporter and shipper, for transportation of packages 
of printing equipment from Germany to Indiana. A series of clauses in the bill of lading provided that 
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COOSA"), 1 which limits the liability of the carrier to $500 per 
package, applied throughout the entire time OWL was responsible for the goods (i.e. until the goods 
reached their final destination). A Himalaya Clause in the same bill of lading extended the carrier's 
defenses to every other carrier and agent providing services related to the transport of the printing 
equipment. A choice of law and forum selection provision called for application of United States law in 
the Southern District of New York. Finally, a Clause Paramount provided that COOSA and its package 
limitations governed during all parts of the inter-modal transportation. 
In regards to the ocean portion of the transport, OWL engaged Yang Ming, a vessel owner. As 
such, Yang Ming issued a sea waybill which provided that Yang Ming, and no subsequent carrier, would 
be held liable for any damage to the goods being transported. Another clause in the sea waybill, a 
Himalaya clause, provided that COOSA applied to all subsequent carriers engaged by Yang Ming. The 
sea waybill called for the application of English law in an English court. Although the sea waybill 
purported to apply COOSA limitations, the bill also offered the shipper an option to declare the full­
value of the package and not be bound by the package limitation. No such value was declared. 
When the packages were damaged during the motor carrier portion of transport, Royal & Sun 
Alliance Insurance ("Royal & Sun") paid White Horse's  claim and subrogated its rights. Royal & Sun 
then filed the instant action for full value of the packages against OWL, Yang Ming and Djuric 
Trucking, jointly and severally. 
At issue is who is liable, and for how much, "when a shipment of goods transported via ship, rail 
and truck from a port in Germany to an inland destination in the United States, is damaged during the 
last leg of the voyage." The issue is complicated because there are two bills of lading, two potentially 
applicable statutory schemes - COOSA and the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act,2 
and inconsistent Supreme Court and Second Circuit opinions.3 
Both COOSA and Carmack allow limitation on liability clauses in a bill of lading, but they do so 
in different ways and under different statutory schemes. COOSA limits the carrier's liability to $500 per 
package unless the nature and value of the goods are declared by the shipper and inserted into the bill of 
lading. This provision allows the shipper chose between a lower freight rate and higher insurance rate 
(if the value is undeclared), or a higher freight rate and lower insurance rate (if the value is declared). 
I 46 U.S.C. §.§ 30701. 
2 49 u.s.c. § 14706. 
3 See Norfolk Southern Railway v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004); Sompo Japan Ins. V Union Pacific R.R. , 456 F. 3d 54 (2d Cir. 






COOSA also allows shippers and carriers to extend its provisions beyond tackle-to-tackle, such that they 
cover the entire inter-modal transport. Norfolk Southern Railway v. Kirby.4 The District Court reasoned 
that the instant case was indistinguishable from Kirby. The court found that the bills of l!lding in the two 
cases contained similar clauses paramount, extended COOSA protections, and limitations of liability for 
package values. The court, however, did not rest here. 
Royal & Sun based its argument on the Second Circuit's decision in Sompo Japan Ins. V. Union 
Pacific R.R.,5 where the Court of Appeals held a rail carrier liable to a shipper because Carmack's 
statutory provisions trumped the parties contract provisions that purported to apply the COOSA package 
limitations. 6 The District Court found this matter distinguishable from Sompo because, unlike the 
defendant rail carrier in Sompo, OWL is an NVOCC and is not subject to the Carmack amendment. 
COOSA, not Carmack, governs the liability of NVOCC's with respect to goods delivered during all 
parts of the inter-modal carriage contemplated by the bill of lading. 
Royal & Sun also invoked Project Hope v. M/V IBN SINA/ where the Court of Appeals upheld 
judgment against an NVOCC and trucker, jointly and severally. The court, in that case, found that the 
Carmack amendment applied to the trucker's inland portion of the carriage and, in any event, the 
NVOCC's and ocean carrier's bills of lading did not attempt to extend the provisions of COOSA to the 
inland portion of the voyage. Again, this court found Project Hope distinguishable. Not only did 
OWL's  bill of lading extend COOSA's provision to the inland portion of the voyage, but Sompo also 
involved a reverse multi-modal carriage of goods - an export from within the United States. Royal & 
Sun's claim against OWL, therefore, was dismissed in as much as is sought recovery beyond $3500. 
The court next looked to Royal & Sun's claims against Yang Ming and Djuric, specifically. 
Yang Ming argued that since its sea waybill limited OWL to bringing suit against it in England, then 
White Horse and Royal & Sun were similarly limited. Yang Ming's argument, however, assumed OWL 
had capacity to bind White Horse as its intermediary agent, which it did not. The court wrote that 
although Kirby allowed an intermediary (i.e. OWL) to bind a shipper regarding liability limitations for 
carriers downstream, nothing in Kirby can be read to extend that ruling to a forum selection clause and a 
covenant not to sue. 
Furthermore, the choice-of-forum clause in Yang Ming's sea waybill contradicted the choice-of­
forum clause in OWL's bill of lading, which called for suit to be brought in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District ofNew York. To this end, Yang Ming and Djuric argued that since they 
were not parties to OWL's bill of lading, that they could not be bound by that clause. The court 
reasoned that White Horse, which was not a party to Yang Ming's  sea waybill, had a reasonable 
expectation of being able to sue in the Southern District of New York as per OWL's bill of lading. 
Moreover, it would be unjust and unreasonable to relegate White Horse to a different forum because of 
the forum selection clause in Yang Ming's sea waybill. White Horse and Royal & Sun, therefore, had 
the right to sue Yang Ming and Djuric wherever they were amenable to suit, including the Southern 
District ofNew York. 
Yang Ming also claimed that its sea waybill barred White Horse from suing Djuric. 
Yang Ming inserted a clause into its sea waybill that purportedly limited a shipper from bringing suit 
against any carrier other than Yang Ming. OWL's bill of lading, on the other hand, gave White Horse 
the reasonable expectation that it could sue any carrier responsible for cargo damage. Again, the court 
cited to Kirby and held that OWL had no right to bind White Horse to conditions in Yang Ming' s sea 
4 543 u.s. 14, 29 (2004). 
5 456 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2006). 
6 See 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a) (requiring rail carriers to offer a shipper a choice among different types of liability coverage and 
affirmatively choose not to pay a higher freight rate for full coverage under a strict liability rule); see also 49 U.S.C. § 
14706(a) (applying a similar requirement on motor transporters). 
7 250 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2001). 
6 
waybill aside from the $500 package limitation. In other words, OWL had no right to forfeit White 
Horse's right to sue Yang Ming and/or Djuric by accepting contradictory terms in Yang Ming's sea 
waybill. Therefore, Yang Ming and Djuric's  motion to dismiss on these grounds were denied. 
Yang Ming and Djuric argued, in the alternative, that their liability should be limited to $500 per 
package under Yang Ming' s sea waybill, OWL's bill of lading, and the provisions of COGS A that make 
such limitation clauses binding in the absence of a shipper's declaration of actual value. White Horse 
undoubtedly agreed to the package limitations. Royal & Sun's subrogated claim for full value of the 
packages, therefore, is really a claim for windfall. Denying such a claim, however, required the court to 
reconcile inconsistent Supreme Court and Second Circuit opinions. If the court followed the Supreme 
Court's  decision in Kirby, then Royal & Sun would not be entitled to such windfall recovery because 
COGSA controlled. On the contrary, if the court followed the Second Circuit's  decision in Sompo, then 
Royal & Sun would be entitled to windfall recovery because, in that instance, Carmack trumped 
COGSA. Factually, Kirby and Sompo are indistinguishable. The Second Circuit' s  only justification for 
not following Kirby was that the Supreme Court failed to mention Carmack in its earlier opinion. 
The court ultimately decided to follow Kirby for several reasons. First, Carmack was designed 
to protect the American farmer from railroad monopolists; not to benefit any of the parties involved in 
this case. Second, to introduce Carmack, and forms that incorporate Carmack, in addition to COGSA, 
would complicate and confuse matters for shippers and carriers, and add to the expense of international 
trade. Last, Kirby, simply, is the higher authority. 
In conclusion, the court limited Royal & Sun's recovery to the COGSA's statutorily proscribed 
$3500. The court granted OWL judgment against Yang Ming and Djuric, jointly and severally, to the 
extent of OWL's liability to Royal & Sun, since Djuric bears direct responsibility for the loss under 
Yang Ming's sea waybill. 
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